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A Nordic Anomaly: Examining the 





 This thesis examines the establishment of an anti-immigrant party (AIP) in 
Sweden. Until recently, Sweden was known as the Nordic anomaly with no AIP in spite 
of high levels of immigration and high rates of right-wing violence. This has now changed, 
and the AIP, Sweden Democrats, are rising to popularity in high speed. I examine the 
causes given for the anomaly up until 2006 and show that a change in these has since cre-
ated a favorable environment for an AIP to become successful. First, socio-economic cleav-
ages have become less salient through decreasing party loyalty and increasing numbers of 
party switchers. Second, the immigration issue has become more politicized. I account for 
other complementary explanations for a Swedish AIP formation and conclude that Sweden 
is no longer an anomaly in the landscape of European AIPs.
Keywords
 anti-immigrant parties, immigration, radical right, Sweden
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Introduction
 Anti-immigrant parties are taking voters with storm throughout Europe. It is a 
surprise to some and expected by others. In some countries, these anti-immigrant parties 
(AIPs) have been a part of the political reality for several decades. This is notably the case 
in several of the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, 
and Finland)1 share many similar demographic, historical, and political characteristics. The 
world knows them for their progressive tax and health care systems, homogenous native 
populations, long winters, and socialist leanings. Except for the Finnish language, the four 
countries are often seen as almost identical parts of the same Nordic entity. Perhaps due to 
the climate of the harsh north, few immigrants have found their way to the North over 
time. But since the 1970s, immigration has increased throughout Europe and large numbers 
have made their way to Sweden. In Denmark, Norway, and Finland political AIPs entered 
the national political stage as a response to the rise of immigration, although these countries 
experienced lower numbers. But an influential AIP in Sweden did not see the light of day 
until the mid-2000s.   
 This paper seeks to extend previous arguments for the lack of a “successful” AIP 
in Sweden until 2006 (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Rydgren, 2010).2 This is done 
by examining the causes of the anomaly up until 2006 and showing that a change in these 
causes has since created a favorable environment for an AIP to be established and successful. 
Until 2006, the anomaly was mostly explained as a result of strong socio-economic cleav-
ages and the low priority of immigration as a national issue in Sweden. Socio-economic 
cleavages were seen as high rates of class voting and low rates of party switchers. I claim 
that since 2006, the weakening of such socio-economic cleavages and an increase in the 
politicization of immigration in Sweden have created a favorable environment for an AIP to 
become successful. 
 The Sweden Democrats are set to have the most successful election of their time 
in September 2018. This will no longer make Sweden an anomaly among the majority of 
European countries. A conventional narrative of Sweden as being uniquely friendly towards 
immigrants have long dominated the perception of the country. This has been informed 
by high levels of immigration (compared to its Nordic neighbors) and no AIP (again, com-
pared to its neighbors). But this narrative is complicated when considering that Sweden 
has higher rates of right-wing extremist violence per capita than any of its three neighbors 
combined. I will here attempt to address this puzzle by drawing on previous work on this 
Swedish exceptionalism and extend them to show how a long-standing tradition of no AIPs 
has recently changed. However, the structural and cultural explanations for this change as 
presented are not the only factors in the complex story of an AIP formation. Matters internal 
to the AIP, the economic story of populism, and different levels of racism can all contribute 
to the story and will be laid out later in the paper.   
1  Iceland and Denmark’s associated territories, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, are also considered a part of the 
Nordic countries, but will not be included in this present study. 
2  A “successful” AIP is an AIP that has received 5% of the votes in three consecutive national elections (Art, 
2011).  
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Successful	AIPs
 The phenomenon of AIPs is spreading and so is the associated terminology that 
tries to capture its full meaning. The most common titles for these parties are “nationalist,” 
“far-right,” “right-wing,” “xenophobic,” “populist,” and “anti-immigrant” parties. Perhaps 
none of the terms fully captures the diversity among the various AIPs, but since a common 
theme is the highlighted stance against immigration, I use the term “anti-immigrant party.” 
I do so with clear reference to Denmark’s most recent and prominent AIP, Dansk Folkeparti 
(“Danish People’s Party” or DPP), Norway’s Fremskrittspartiet (“Progress Party” or FrP), 
Finland’s Perussuomalaiset (“The Finns Party” or FP), and Sweden’s Sverige Demokraterne 
(“Sweden Democrats” or SD). My dependent variable is AIP success. Art considers an AIP 
“successful” when it receives over 5% of the votes in three consecutive national elections 
(Art, 2011, 4). I choose this measurement as I am looking for established and long-term 
influential AIPs in Sweden, with brief comparisons to the rest of the Nordic countries, not 
just the existence of short-lived and newly established AIPs from time to time. I assume that 
long-lived AIPs have a better opportunity to shape policies and debates as they solidify their 
presence in Parliament. 
The	Nordic	Context
 The current study is not a comparative study, but I still believe that we can better 
approach the puzzle of the Swedish anomaly by putting it in context of its Nordic neigh-
bors. I here include a brief synopsis of the emergence of the successful AIPs in Denmark, 
Norway, and Finland for contextual purposes. There will be a slight emphasis on Denmark 
in examples throughout the study. 
Denmark
 Denmark is home to one of Western Europe’s oldest and most influential AIPs. 
Fremskridtspariet (“Progress Party” or PP) took Denmark by storm in a landslide election 
in 1973. As the first Danish AIP, PP received 15.9% of the national vote. The influence 
of an AIP has remained in the Danish Parliament since, although the impact of PP would 
dwindle in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Betz, 1994). In 1995 two prominent figures of 
PP broke out to form what is still known today as the DPP. The formation of DPP secured 
a continuing presence of an AIP in the Danish Parliament. DPP received 7.4% of the na-
tional votes in its first election in 1998 and provided necessary parliamentary support for the 
minority conservative-liberal coalition from 2001-2011. This position gave DPP the ability 
to steer policies (particularly on the issue of immigration) without taking any official seats in 
the government. 
 Although a Social Democratic government was in place from 2011-2015, DPP 
remained the third-biggest political party in the Parliament with much bargaining power. 
The 2015 national election took DPP to its so-far highest peak with 21.1% of the votes. 
They still chose to remain outside of government, in spite of being the second largest politi-
cal party in Parliament. This decision, again, positioned them as the necessary parliamentary 
support for a minority conservative-liberal government coalition. With this brief overview 
in mind, and by extending the influence of PP through the break-off party DPP (I justify 
this with the argument that the majority of the party platform and party membership and 
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leadership continued through DPP), we can determine that Denmark has had the presence 
of a successful AIP since 1977.3  
Norway
 Although Norway’s FrP has had strong electoral power for many years, it has had 
significantly less policy influence than DPP. FrP received 5% at its first election in 1973, 
where after votes died down for some years, only to return with 13% of the vote in 1989. 
It has been in parliament every election except for one since 1973 but would only have 
been considered successful by Art by 1997. It peaked with 22.9% of the votes in 2009 but 
has gone down to 15.3% at the most recent election in 2017. Unlike DPP, FrP accepted 
an invitation to join the center-right government and has been in power since 2013 with 
seven out of nineteen ministerial posts. Until then, considerable efforts had been made by 
the centrist parties to exclude the FrP from any significant influence on policymaking. 
Finland
 Finland’s current AIP, FP, has been around since 1995. It rose out of the ashes of 
was its predecessor, Suomen Maaseudun Puolue (“Finnish Rural Party”). The Rural Party 
collapsed after having marked Finnish politics by its agrarian and populist agenda since 1959 
(they received over 5% of the votes in four out of ten national elections). Similar to SD, FP 
experienced a rise in the mid-2000s and have been in Parliament since. As they have only 
received over 5% of the votes in the past two elections (2011 and 2015), they have yet to be 
considered successful by Art’s standard. 
 Nevertheless, FP joined the governing coalition in 2015, after becoming the sec-
ond largest party in Finland. The alliance only lasted two years as the party split in 2017 and 
FP left the government. A defector group, Blue Reform, continuously supports the coali-
tion, but the now opposition party, FP, is still weakened by the split.  
Sweden:	The	Nordic	Anomaly
 Sweden has seen a large influx of immigrants since the 1970s. According to Swe-
den’s official website, beginning in the early 1970s, it is estimated that some 45,000 people 
with Chilean background now call Sweden home after fleeing Augusto Pinochet’s dictator-
ship from 1973-1990 (sweden.se, 2016). In the 1980s and 1990s, many Middle Eastern and 
North African immigrants as well as 100,000 Bosnians after the Balkan conflicts arrived in 
Sweden. South American immigrants continued to come. After joining the Schengen zone 
in 2001, immigration continuously increased with about 29,000 immigrants from outside 
the Schengen zone arriving during the 2000s. The refugee crisis in 2014-2015 would com-
pletely change the dynamics of Swedish immigration. Although many immigrants from 
the 1970s-2000s had come from non-Western countries, still a large part of Sweden’s im-
migrants was from predominantly Catholic and Western-minded countries. In 2014 alone, 
Sweden received more than 100,000 immigrants, the majority of these being Syrian, Er-
itrean and stateless refugees. In 2015 this number rose to 160,000, down to 140,000 in 2016, 
3  It is worth noticing that PP received less than 5% of the votes in the 1984 and the 1987 elections (3.6 and 
4.8%). They nevertheless remained in Parliament but would not have been considered successful by Art during 
those two election cycles. 
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and 125,000 in 2017. Sweden now takes in more immigrants per capita than any other 
country in Europe (Hinde & Silberstein, 2017).
 The large amounts of immigrants did not result in a long-standing successful AIP. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to establish influential AIPs in Sweden,4 SD emerged in 
1988. SD remained a smaller party not represented in the national Parliament but instead 
represented in local communes and the European Parliament until 2006. That year they 
rose above 1.5% of the national vote for the first time, achieving 2.9%. Had they run in 
Denmark, that result would have taken them above the electoral threshold of 2%, whereas 
the result was still well below the 4% Swedish electoral threshold needed to gain representa-
tion in Parliament. The two following national elections were very fruitful for SD, which 
received 5.7% of the votes in the 2010 general election and 12.9% in the 2014 election (see 
Table 1, below). 
Table 1: Swedish Election Results 1976-2014 (percent)
Source: Swedish National Election Studies (SNES), Swedish Voting Behavior, 2017.  
 The 2018 national elections are likely to be the first year of a successful AIP in 
Sweden, as a third consecutive performance above 5% seems inevitable. In fact, a June 2018 
opinion poll shows that SD is estimated to receive 28.5% of the votes if there was an election 
tomorrow yougov.se, 2018). That is up from an estimated 19.6% in March 2018 (yougov.
se, 2018; IPSOS, 2018; SIFO, 2018; Frick; 2018). Such a result would make SD the biggest 
party in Sweden with a large margin over the second biggest party, the Social Democrats, 
who received 22% in the same opinion poll. Although using opinion polls as legitimate 
markers is difficult, any such result will make SD not only a successful AIP by Art’s stan-
4  Bevara Sverige Svenskt (“Keep Sweden Swedish”) was an anti-immigrant movement formed in 1972 which 
later merged with the populist party Framstegspartiet (“Progress Party”). The merged party became known as 
Sverigepartiet (“Sweden Party”) but regroup as the Sweden Democrats just two years later in 1988. 
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dards, but also in a position for power that no other AIP has been in Nordic countries. It 
will be harder for any coalition to form around and might for the first time force the other 
parties to include an only recent “extreme” AIP in the nation’s government. 
Claims
 Two claims have stood the test of explaining the Swedish anomaly up until 2006. 
These claims take an external perspective. They account for the structural and cultural con-
ditions surrounding the establishment of AIPs that can either prevent or enable their success. 
Firstly, structural conditions of deep socio-economic cleavages have “protected” Sweden 
from the rise of an AIP (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Rydgren, 2010). Secondly, 
cultural conditions seen in the lack of the politicization of immigration issues in Sweden 
has lowered the chances of a successful AIP (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Rydgren, 
2010). Although different, these claims are complementary and act as two sides of the same 
coin in the process of party formations. The cultural aspects of the phenomenon explain the 
areas that a merely structural approach does not cover. Although the structural factors are 
to some degree easier measured than cultural factors are, I believe the cultural element has a 
vital part to play. 
 Since SD has risen to an almost “successful” level over the past decade, it is impera-
tive that we examine if the same variables can explain this new phenomenon. As such, these 
two independent variables will not only explain the lack of a Swedish AIP but also that a 
change in these variables has led to a successful Swedish AIP. I expect to see this through the 
weakening of socio-economic cleavages and the increase in the politicization of immigra-
tion issues in Sweden.  
Socio-Economic Cleavages 
 Deep socio-economic cleavages have “protected” Sweden from the rise of an AIP. 
Socio-economic cleavages are divisions of voters by social class or identification. Cleavages 
manifest themselves in party loyalty based on socio-economic (or “class”) voting (i.e., work-
ers voting for Social Democrats and the middle and upper-class voting for the Conserva-
tives). These cleavages have long been weakening in Denmark (Rydgren, 2010), and have 
recently been on the decline in Sweden as well. As party loyalty decreases, voter volatility 
increases. Party loyalty can be measured by changes in party switchers and levels of class-
voting, something that can lead to floating voters for AIPs to more easily recruit. 
 Party Switchers. Party switching has dramatically increased in Sweden since the 
early 1990s. Party switching indicates that a voter changes their party of choice from one 
election to another. As party switching increase, AIPs are more likely to gain votes from 
floating voters. Figure 1 shows data on party switchers in Swedish elections from 1960-2014 
depicts the percentage of Swedish voters that changed the party they voted on from the 
party they voted on in the previous general election. Note especially the changes from the 
1991 election and again during the 2002 election. 
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Figure 1: Party Switchers in Swedish Elections 1960-2014 (percent)
Source: SNES, Swedish Voting Behavior, 2017.  
 As we can see, party switchers have generally been on the rise since 1960. Worth 
noting is the high jump in party switchers from the 1988 election to the 1991 election when 
New Democracy entered the political stage. Although their success was short-lived and 
their decline in the 1994 election would explain a significant decrease in party switchers that 
election, the trend remains high. This signaled that the mode of party loyalty had changed 
in Sweden and that the following elections were expected to be marked by higher levels of 
party switching. 
 The increased voter volatility paved the way for SD in 2006. Previous to this, the 
general trend had been upward-moving, but we see the highest jump in the percentage of 
party switchers since the elections of New Democracy in 1991 from 2002-2006. The 2006 
elections, the same year that SD secured 2.9% of the votes, saw a high jump from 31.8% 
to 37.1% of voters changing parties from the previous election in 2002. The percentage 
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continues to decline in the following election,5 but goes up again in 2014 when SD secures 
12.9% of the votes, up from 5.7% in 2010. It is very likely that the increase from 2010-2014 
of 32.8-35.4% of party switchers is mainly explained by the rise of SD and the subsequent 
decline of Moderaterne (“Moderates,” a Swedish Conservative Party or M) (see Table 1). 
 The same election volatility is seen in the decline of voters who vote for the same 
party three consecutive elections. Figure 2 shows the percentage of Swedish voters voting 
for the same (orange) or different (grey) party three elections in a row.   
Figure 2: Individual Level Three Election Volatility in Swedish General 
Elections. The Proportion of Voters Voting for the Same/Different Parties at 
Three Consecutive Elections 1974-2014 (percent)
Source: Statistics Sweden, Democracy Statistics Report no 21: Floating voters, 2016. 
 Following the trend as depicted in Figure 1, the volatility of voters is also increas-
ing here. Figure 2 shows an overall decreasing percentage of voters voting for the same 
party three elections in a row from 1976-2014. Assuming that as voter volatility goes up, the 
likelihood of an AIP’s ability to recruit new voters increases, the voting patterns for Sweden 
5   Explanations for the otherwise high jump could be seen in the Moderates who had experienced a significant 
dip in their vote share in the 2002 election, a number that went up again and stayed high from the 2006 elections 
and onwards. Additionally, the results in 2006 also included 2.1% of the votes to “other parties” and 0.7% of the 
general vote which went to the newly established Feminist Initiative party, FI (see Table 1). 
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indicate that such recruiting grounds are now better than ever.  
 Class Voting. Another aspect of socio-economic cleavages is class voting. As 
political parties are losing traction all over the Western democratic world, so are traditional 
“class parties” (Mair, 2013). As class parties lose their grip on their traditional voters, party 
loyalty declines, and more maneuver room for an AIP to compete for the votes opens up. 
This is also the case in Sweden. Figure 3 depicts the percentage of workers and middle-class 
citizens that voted socialist from 1956-2014. Traditionally, workers have been more likely 
to vote socialist. As the size of the middle-class has increased, the number of traditional 
workers has declined. Some of these former workers, now middle-class, continue to vote 
socialist. However, the overall decline of the socialist votes among these groups have been 
larger than the increase in middle-class votes for the same. 
Figure 3: Class Voting in Swedish Elections 1956-2014. 
Percentage Voting Socialist among Workers and in the Middle Class (percent)
Source: SNES, Swedish Voting Behavior, 2017.  
 Class voting among workers has been on the decline since 1960. After a deep dip 
in 1991 with the appearance of Nationaldemokraterna (ND), the numbers went up again in 
1994 and have been on a steady decline since similar to that of previous decades. Although 
not dramatic, the decline has been reaching lower numbers than ever before in 2010 and 
2014, indicating higher volatility among voters than before. We also see a decline among 
middle-class voters from 1994-2010, although this increases from 2010-2014. Although the 
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decline in class voters among workers and socialist parties does not directly explain the rise 
of SD, it shows a more volatile political climate in which fewer are loyal to their old par-
ties. Nevertheless, as most of SD’s voters have come from the Moderates, a decline among 
middle-class voters have arguably opened up for the establishment of SD since 2002. 
 SD mobilizes otherwise nonparticipating Swedish voters. Besides voter migration 
from Moderates to SD since 2002, it is likely that many of SD votes come from voters with 
low political interest. Figure 4 shows turnout in Swedish general elections among voters 
with different degrees of political interest. 
Figure 4: Turnout in Swedish Riksdag Elections among 
Voters with Different Degrees of Political Interest (percent)
Source: SNES, Swedish Voting Behavior, 2017.  
 Not surprisingly, the voters who are “not at all interested” in politics vote the least. 
However, their participation has gone up drastically since 2002 compared to their 1994 
and 1998 turnout. Similarly, the voters who are “not particularly interested” have also had 
higher turnouts since 2002. Although this does not account for the decline in participation 
among these two disinterested groups in the 1990s, it is interesting to note that the last two 
times their participation has increased since 1985 for the “not particularly interested” group 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2018/iss1/10
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 1 0 3
and 1979 for the “not at all interested” group have been the years with an AIP on the bal-
lot.6  
 Voter volatility has gone up in Sweden. Volatility has created voters more recep-
tive to AIP recruiting as they switch parties more, are less likely to vote for the same party 
three elections in a row, and as class voting decrease. Additionally, there has been an increase 
in voter turnout among politically disinterested voters, indicating that additional dealign-
ment/realignment mechanisms are shifting in Sweden. 
Politicization of Immigration	
 The politicization of immigration issues impacts the likelihood for the success of 
an AIP. The politicization of immigration issues (along with agenda setting and framing) 
increase public attention and awareness on the subject. This can act as an advantage for those 
political parties with platforms primarily on the issues of immigration. It is partly due to a 
culture of political correctness and a hesitancy to acknowledge issues surrounding immigra-
tion and racism that is found notablly in Swedish, and not to the same degree in Danish 
culture (Pred, 2000). The use of the terminology ‘political correctness’ is here meant to in-
dicate the culturally embedded taboos and inability or lack of political will to discuss specific 
difficult topics in public. 
 Political correctness hinders the establishment of AIPs because it keeps immigra-
tion from being discussed in public. Thus the “voicing” of concerns is not legitimized or 
facilitated. New research shows a beginning trend between the absence of such a political 
“voice” channel (such as an AIP) and higher levels of right-wing violence (Ravndal, 2017). 
Although it is possible that Sweden could be an example of such a pattern, more research is 
needed to solidify this theory. Nevertheless, the politicization of immigration issues is now 
on the rise in Sweden. Table 2 shows the top election issues among voters in Swedish elec-
tions from 1970-2014.
6  Future versions of this paper will here include dealignment theory and data on SD’s success among these 
groups.
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Table 2: Election Issues in Sweden 1979-2014. 
Percentage of Party Voters Who on an Open-Ended Question 
Mentioned the Various Issue Areas as Important for Their Party Choice (per-
cent)
Source: SNES, Swedish Voting Behavior, 2017.  
 When respondents were asked an open-ended question about the issues important 
to their party choice, the salience of the immigration issue rose from 9-23% from 2010-
2014. A similar increase is backed up by a study that goes one year beyond the study pre-
sented in Table 2 (see Figure 5). In Figure 5 we again see the importance of the immigration 
issues for voters but see a towering increase in 2015, the year following SD’s 12.9% of the 
votes and the global attention to the refugee crisis. 
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Figure 5: The Importance of the Immigration Issue, 1987-2015 (percent)
Source: Bergström and Oscarsson (2015), Demker and van der Meiden (2016)
 It is difficult to tell whether the politicization is a result of SD’s prominence or 
whether the politicization has resulted in more opportunities for SD (Rydgren, 2010). It is 
likely that both are the case. But it is undoubted that SD is changing their image and becom-
ing more mainstream (Rydgren and van der Meiden, 2016). Figure 6 shows the number of 
times SD were mentioned in the Swedish media, compared to two other smaller political 
parties. 
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Figure 6: Mentioning of SD in Swedish Printed Press and Web, 1988-2014 
Source: Rydgren and van der Meiden (2016). 
 The increase in the importance immigration issues played for Swedish voters as 
well as SD’s media attention indicates a heightened interest in immigration that is likely due 
to an increase in the politicization of immigration. 
Other	Explanations
 The Swedish anomaly is a complicated story. Although my primary focus in this 
paper is on two specific structural and cultural phenomena that explain the changes in Swe-
den, there are many other factors commonly used in such explanations. Following are brief 
synopses of popular notions of what might have attributed to the Swedish anomaly.   
A Difference in Levels of Racism
Danes are xenophobes and Swedes are xenophiles. This is perhaps the most com-
mon notion expressed about the Swedish anomaly, when compared to its smaller neighbor 
to the south, Denmark. In a recent study performed by Pew Research Center, 25% of 
Danes scored higher than five on a 10-point scale of nationalism, anti-immigrant, and anti-
minority sentiment (Pew Research Center, 2018, 75). Only 8% of Swedes scored higher 
than five. To infer that Danes, therefore, are more racist introduces three problems. First, 
although Danes often rank higher in self-perceived racism studies, expressed racism does not 
necessarily generate racist behavior. Secondly, this does not explain the success of SD among 
Swedes, a party that has an expressed anti-immigrant policy platform very similar to DPP’s. 
This could be explained by the lag in the politicization of immigration issues in Sweden and 
perhaps a reluctance on behalf of Swedes to brand themselves as anti-immigrant. Thirdly, 
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Sweden has had higher levels of right-wing extremist violence per capita than any other Eu-
ropean country from 1990 to 2015 (Ravndal, 2017). Additionally, it has experienced more 
right-wing violence than have Denmark, Norway, and Finland combined in the same pe-
riod (ibid.). These three points challenge the idea (often portrayed by Swedish elites (Pred, 
2000)) that Swedes like strangers/immigrants more and therefore have not had an AIP.
A Difference in Electoral Thresholds
Another common explanation refers to the difference in electoral thresholds. Sweden 
requires a political party to receive 4% of the general vote in a national election to obtain 
seats in parliament, whereas Denmark only requires 2%. Although the Danish threshold is 
unusually low (only the Netherlands with their 0.67% is lower worldwide), both are lower 
than Art’s 5% threshold, and there is, therefore, no definitive difference when considering 
an AIP successful. However, there is a significant difference when considering a party’s 
ability to gain an advantage by being represented in Parliament earlier on. However, when 
searching through all political parties on the general ballot in Sweden from 1910-1998, I 
find no AIP that received between 2-4% of the vote (Statistics Sweden, 1998). That leads 
me to conclude that the argument of “had an attempting AIP only run in Denmark, the 
AIP would have gotten electoral seats” is wrong. The only time any other AIP besides SD 
obtained seats in Parliament was New Democracy in 1991, but they did so with such a high 
margin that a lower electoral threshold would not have mattered. The only exception to this 
claim is the 2006 election in which SD received 2.9% of the general vote. This would have 
given them seats in Parliament in Denmark but did not otherwise deter them as they have 
received well over 4% of the vote in both elections since then.   
A Difference in Political Strategies among Centrist Parties
A 2011 study shows “a dismissive issue strategy [as adopted by the established Centrist 
parties] has been effective in reducing support for anti-immigrant parties” (Dahlström, Carl 
and Peter Esaiasson, 2011, 1). This theory explains the Swedish anomaly by showing sig-
nificant effort on behalf of the Centrist parties to dismiss any attempts of a Swedish AIP to 
be established and to receive political backing by any other parliament party. However, this 
does not explain the sudden rise of SD since 2010 (the study was submitted before the 2010 
general election), particularly when bearing in mind the continued dismissive strategy as 
portrayed by the Centrist parties in Sweden since the entrance of SD. Norway’s centrist par-
ties likewise attempted to keep FrP at bay but succumbed to its sheer number of vote-shares 
and invited them to join the governing coalition in 2013. The same happened in Finland 
in 2015. Only Denmark is an outlier here as DPP does not wish to join the government, in 
spite of being the second biggest party in the country. It is possible that the election results 
in Sweden in September 2018 will change the political strategies of the centrist parties, as 
they have in the other Nordic countries once the AIPs became significant in size. 
The Economy of Populism
It is commonly argued that the stagnation of the economy since 2008 is contributing 
to the rise of populism across Europe. But that does not explain the Swedish anomaly until 
2006. The Swedish case might in fact, at first sight, suggest that the decline in class voting 
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indicates that the economy matters less now. But the economic stagnation might overall 
explain part of the sudden rise of SD since 2006. To test this argument, we would have 
to control for economic changes over time within Sweden. Although that is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is important to note the influencing factor that the economy has likely 
played in SD’s rise since 2006. 
Matters Internal to the AIP
The establishment and breakthrough of AIPs are primarily due to their organizational 
strength, leaders, and local candidate base (Mudde, 2007; Art, 2011; Loxbo & Bolin 2016). 
Art emphasizes internal factors, such as party organization and the quality of party activists, 
as key elements in making an AIP successful. To differentiate successful from unsuccessful 
AIPs (and political parties in general), we have to look at the internal life of the party. I agree 
that internal matters are an aspect of party formations and declines that cannot be over-
looked. It is likely that internal matters help explain the disappearance of New Democracy 
after their good election results in 1991. It can also help us understand SD’s ability to rise to 
the moment in a time of political volatility in Sweden. But I claim that it does not explain 
the entirety of the Swedish anomaly and more recent success of SD. 
Proportional Representation is Conducive to the Emergence of AIPs
Lastly, it is often argued that electoral systems of proportional representation are favor-
able to the rise of any extreme parties, including AIPs. Although I do not dispute this argu-
ment, this argument does not explain the variation in the success of AIPs as all four Nordic 
countries have proportional representation as their electoral system. 
Conclusion	
 Previous research has attempted to explain the lack of a Swedish AIP until 2006. 
This was done by showing that salient socio-economic cleavages had protected Sweden 
against the emergence of an AIP and that immigration as an issue had been of lower impor-
tance among Swedish voters. Both resulted in structural and cultural conditions that were 
not conducive to the establishment of an AIP. I have here built on mentioned research by 
attempting to explain how these same patterns have changed and created a space for SD to 
become successful.  
 Waning traditional voting patterns allow fringe-parties to monopolize on floating 
voters. SD is doing so successfully during a time when voter volatility in Sweden is increas-
ing. Party alliances based on traditional socio-economic patterns have been decreasing, as 
seen through the decrease in class voting. That is also backed up by the rising numbers of 
party switchers. When fewer voters stay with the same party as in previous elections, it 
indicates that voters not previously available are now susceptible to a party change. SD has 
been able to capitalize on this unfreezing of the traditional voting system, and although the 
changes did not start when SD arrived, they have been able to capitalize on a changing po-
litical landscape and have succeeded in disrupting the system further. 
 The issue of immigration is now front and center of the Swedish public debate. 
That was not always the case, and a heightened politicization of immigration is likely ben-
efitting SD. Although it is hard to prove whether the politicization is a cause or a conse-
quence of the rise of SD, it is a part of a changing culture that is making anti-immigrant 
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stances more legitimate. We see that in the increasing and growing media presence of SD. 
The culture change around the politicization of immigration thus contributes to the mecha-
nism of moving voters towards SD. 
 The structural and cultural aspects are not the only determinants of the political 
change. I have in this paper given a brief overview of the many possible explanations for the 
change in Sweden. Some are more liable than others, but I hope to have painted the picture 
of the complex nature of this phenomenon, in spite of giving my primary focus to just two 
aspects in this paper. 
 It is clear that Sweden was a Nordic anomaly for many years. But as the political 
landscape changes, it is becoming more similar to its neighbors. However, we still need to 
address the difference in the speed and the size of growth that SD, and multiple other recent 
AIPs or right-wing populist movements in the West, have experienced compared to DPP 
and others that have slowly and steadily increased over time. How they differ has impli-
cations for how we understand AIP formations as well as how we tackle their disruptive 
nature. Appropriate solutions are unlikely to be found until much more of the life of these 
AIPs is understood.
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